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Smoke or Vapor?  
Regulation of Tobacco and Vaping  
James E. Prieger 
Executive summary 
E-cigarettes and vaping raise new questions about the risks to health from their use and how 
they should be regulated and taxed compared to tobacco. The latter has a long history of taxation and a 
more recent history of regulation in the United States. E-cigarettes, on the other hand, have only recent 
begun to be regulated, but by treating them as “tobacco products” the federal regulator includes them 
by default in the regulatory apparatus design for tobacco control and is sending the tacit message that 
they are just as harmful as smoking. That is not likely to be the case. 
Rationales for regulating tobacco center around correcting for adverse consequence to others of 
smokers’ decisions, correcting for faulty reasoning of smokers, and paternalism. Taxes and regulations 
on tobacco can have the unintended consequences of increasing inequality, since their burden falls 
mainly on lower-income individuals, and stimulating illicit trade in tobacco. 
Discussion of regulation targeting e-cigarettes begins with answering many fundamental 
questions about vaping: is vaping safer than smoking? (almost surely so); can e-cigarettes aid cessation 
of smoking? (most likely); are children getting addicted to e-cigarettes (perhaps, but probably not in the 
numbers often assumed); does vaping lead to smoking? (unknown; the evidence is much weaker than 
often presented); will the new federal prohibition on selling e-cigarettes to those under 21 years of age 
reduce youth vaping? (unknown, since sales to youth were already disallowed in most places); are there 
health harms from secondhand vapor? (possibly, but they are almost surely much less than any from 
secondhand smoke); and whether restrictions on tobacco advertising apply (or should apply) to e-
cigarettes (most do not, and applying them may hinder adult cessation). Unintended consequences of 
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regulating e-cigarettes include the potential for exacerbating the problem of illicit trade, which already 
exists, and discouraging harm reduction for smokers who would otherwise switch to vaping. 
The state of knowledge about the health harms of e-cigarettes and other relevant factors are far 
too uncertain to arrive at a solid idea of what optimal regulation would look like or what the optimal tax 
rate would be, as conventionally defined by economists. However, several steps can be taken in the 
right direction. For tobacco, the possibility that tax rates are too high must be considered. Regarding e-
cigarettes: 1) the concept of risk-proportionate regulation should be the guiding principle; 2) the 
tendencies to understate the likely health benefits of switching from cigarettes to e-cigarettes should be 
curbed; 3) the uncertainty regarding the health effects of e-cigarettes should not be used to discourage 
smokers to switch; 4) targeting regulation narrowly at youth is better than broadly applied rules; 5) 
heavily taxing e-cigarettes is not likely to be in the best interests of public health; 6) careful 
consideration of whether banning the use of e-cigarettes in public spaces is appropriate is warranted; 
and 7) regulatory uncertainty at the federal level should be resolved quickly. Finally, in regards to both 
tobacco and e-cigarettes, serious attention must be paid to the interplay among illicit markets, taxation, 
regulation, smoking, and vaping. In particular, since e-cigarettes offer smokers an alternative to buying 
illicit tobacco products, e-cigarettes can attenuate the link between tobacco taxation and illicit trade and 
thus can provide a valuable “safety valve.” 
1 Introduction 
Given the well-known health harms from smoking, tobacco is regulated and taxed nearly 
everywhere around the world. With the introduction of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS), 
commonly known as e-cigarettes, new questions have arisen about the risks to health from their use 
and whether they should be regulated as strictly as tobacco. In some quarters, the promise that e-
cigarettes and vaping could potentially delivery an attractive, smoking-like sensory experience while 
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avoiding the health harms from combusting and inhaling tobacco has been greeted with enthusiasm, 
since the new products could help some smokers transition to a less risky product. In other quarters, 
and in much of the American public health community, e-cigarettes were greeted with skepticism and 
hostility, since they could potentially renormalize smoking, set back the great gains in tobacco control of 
the past several decades, and hook a new young generation on nicotine and smoking. This chapter 
covers the regulatory history of tobacco and e-cigarettes, upcoming regulatory actions and challenges, a 
discussion of the key issues involved with regulation of these activities, and suggestions toward better 
regulation. 
Before continuing, a brief discussion of vaping technology and terminology will be helpful. All e-
cigarettes work by means of a battery operated heater that vaporizes an e-liquid, which is then inhaled 
by the user. Sometimes grouped with e-cigarettes are heat-not-burn (HNB) products that heat ground 
tobacco  without combustion. There are many types of e-cigarettes and vaping systems, from cartridge-
based “closed” systems in which the consumer buys a disposable, unmodifiable e-liquid cartridge, to 
tank-based “open” systems in which the vaper buys vials of e-liquid for refill and can customize what is 
vaped. All of these will be referred to as “e-cigarettes” and their consumption will be called “vaping” 
unless a distinction among products is required. The exception is that when discussing the scientific 
literature on the health effects of e-cigarettes, HNB products are typically not included in the studies. 
Finally, use of e-cigarettes is not smoking; nothing is combusted and there is no smoke. 
2 Regulation of tobacco and e-cigarettes in the United States 
2.1 Tobacco and Smoking 
From 1900 to 1964, per capita consumption of cigarettes grew rapidly from a low figure, until in 
the latter year the average was more than half a pack a day per adult.1 The watershed moment in the 
history of smoking in this country was the publication of the Surgeon General’s report in 1964, which 
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stated that “cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant 
appropriate remedial action.”2 After that year, consumption began its long decline, falling to 0.13 packs 
sold a day per adult in 2018.3 Of course, the average smoker consumes more than that. In 2018, adult 
smokers reported smoking a bit more than half a pack a day, while retail sales of cigarettes averaged a 
bit less than one pack  per day per adult smoker.4 That same year, there were about 34 million adult 
cigarette smokers and 49 million adult users of any tobacco product, including e-cigarettes.5 These 
figures imply that the prevalence of cigarette smoking has fallen to 13.7% among adults, while the 
prevalence of any form of tobacco consumption is 19.7%. Adult cigarette smoking prevalence has 
declined about two-thirds from its peak in the 1960s. 
The sale and use of tobacco has been regulated in various ways for decades in the United States, 
although much of the regulatory action has come relatively recently compared to the long history of 
smoking. The first federal action regarding the tobacco industry and the health effects of its products 
was the required addition of the notice that smoking “may be hazardous to your health” on packs. The 
health warning, which came into effect in 1966, was the first of its kind in the world.6 Despite the 
landmark Surgeon General’s report in 1964, until the 1980s tobacco was specifically exempted from 
legislation (e.g., the Toxic Substances Control Act) and regulation (e.g., by the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission) that otherwise would have curtailed the industry or the freedom to smoke.7 In 1985, a set 
of four rotating health warnings with stronger wording were required on cigarette packaging.8 The FDA 
sought to add graphical health warnings in 2011, but legal action by the tobacco industry has delayed 
the requirement for almost a decade.9 
The first federally mandated restrictions on where one could smoke came in the late 1980s with 
bans on smoking on certain domestic airline flights.10 The so-called Synar Amendment of 1992 required 
all states to adopt and enforce restrictions on the sales and distribution of tobacco to minors; federal 
enforcement of the restrictions (through the withholding of certain federal payments to the States) 
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went into effect in 1996.11 While as recently as the 1980s some states had no restrictions on sales to 
minors, however defined, by 1995 all states and the District of Columbia prohibited the sale and 
distribution of tobacco products to those under 18 years of age.12  
In 1998, the three major tobacco manufacturers signed the Master Settlement Agreement 
(MSA) with 46 states. In exchange for immunity from legal claims by these states for costs incurred for 
smoking-related illnesses and death, the three major tobacco manufacturers agreed to pay the states an 
estimated $206 billion, finance a $1.5 billion anti-smoking campaign, and cease various forms of 
advertising, product placement, event sponsorship, and any form of marketed aimed at youth. While 
the settling states say that “the central purpose of the MSA is to reduce smoking, especially in American 
youth,”13 it appears that the states spend little of the money collected from the MSA and tobacco taxes 
on tobacco prevention and cessation programs—well less than three percent in 2018.14 
The entering wedge for direct federal regulation of tobacco as a consumer product came with 
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) of 2009, which granted the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products. The FDA’s first action under the 
TCA was to issue a rule in 2010 prohibiting the sale of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to any person 
under age 18 (which was already illegal in all states).15 Since that time there has been a steady flow of 
proposed and final rules and “guidance” from the FDA regarding tobacco regulation. Figure 1 shows the 
growth of federal regulation regarding tobacco over time, as measured by the cumulative number of 
pages of rules in the Federal Register. By 2015, there were over 200 pages of binding regulations, and by 
the beginning of 2020 there were 224 pages of rules, over 150 pages of guidance regarding those rules, 
and well over 400 accumulated pages of proposed rules. The pages of proposed rules nearly doubled in 




Figure 1: The growth of federal regulation regarding tobacco and e-cigarettes from the FDA  
In the first of two recent federal regulatory actions, the age limit for retail sales of tobacco 
products after December 2019 was raised from 18 to 21 years of age.16 Before that time, well fewer than 
half the states had an age restriction that high. In its most recent action, the FDA issued rules requiring 
graphical warnings on cigarette packages. These new color graphics depicting the negative health 
consequences of smoking will occupy the entire top half of the area of the front and rear faces of 
cigarette packages.17 Some research indicates that such large graphical warnings are more likely to be 
noticed by smokers or more likely to lead them to consider cessation or smoking less.18 
In addition to tobacco regulations, the federal government has levied excise taxes on cigarettes 
continuously since the time of the Civil War.19 The tax remained at 8 cents a pack from 1951 to 1983, 
when it was doubled. In the early 1990s the tax was raised to 24 cents, and in the early 2000 the tax was 




State taxes on tobacco vary widely, although most states have increased their cigarette taxes in 
the last two decades. From 1970 to 2018, the average state excise tax (not weighted for population or 
consumption) increased from 9.6 cents per pack to $1.74, for an annualized growth rate of 7.5% 
(inflation during this period averaged 3.9% per year) (see Figure 2). State taxes grew exceptionally 
quickly after 2000, with a growth rate of the average tax of 7.5% per year (compared to inflation of 2.0% 
per year). Adding the federal tax on top of the state taxes shows that the combined rates rose by an 
average of 5.7% per year since 1970 and 6.9% per year since 2000. These large increases in the taxes 
over time resulted in almost 40% of the retail sales prices of cigarettes going to excise taxes in 2018, or, 
to put it another way, an effective 65% tax rate on a pack.  
Figure 2 also shows the population weighted averages of the taxes; these reflect the excise taxes 
facing the average person in the nation. For the most part these are similar to the simple averages, with 
the exception of a divergence in 2017 due to California enacting a large tax increase.  Overall, these 
levels of taxation make cigarettes one of the most highly taxed products in the nation. By comparison, 




Figure 2: The growth of state and federal excise taxation on cigarettes 
2.2 E-Cigarettes 
The market for e-cigarette products in the United States began to take off around 2006. In 2008, 
the e-cigarette market had only $28 million in revenue from an estimated 190,000 vapers, but by 2017 it 
was a $4.6 billion market earned from an estimated 8.4 million vapers.21 Those figures represent a 
revenue growth rate of over 50% per year.  Given the recency of e-cigarettes as a significant product it is 
unsurprising that the regulatory history regarding vaping is short. In 2016, the FDA “deemed” e-
cigarettes (or, more properly speaking, electronic nicotine delivery systems, ENDS) to be tobacco 
products. While the FDA has the legal authority to deem new or existing products to be tobacco 
products, and thus subject to their regulatory authority, it is worth noting that ENDS do not contain 
tobacco. While nicotine is the addictive substance found in tobacco, it is the other constituents in 
tobacco that, when combusted and inhaled, cause the main health problems associated with smoking. 
In particular, to quote a report from the National Academies of Sciences, “there is no evidence to 
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indicate that nicotine is a carcinogen.”22 Thinking of e-cigarettes as a tobacco product thus greatly 
confuses the issue, a point to which we will return below. 
After deeming e-cigarettes to be a tobacco product, the FDA aimed its entire set of tobacco-
related regulations at vaping products as well. Manufacturers of existing products had to register with 
the FDA and submit lists of products, their ingredients, and evidence on their health effects.23 Products 
are now required to place on the packaging a warning that they contain nicotine and that nicotine is an 
addictive chemical. Products introduced between 2007 and August 2016 could continue to be sold while 
their applications for regulatory approval were considered by the FDA.24 New e-cigarette products are 
not allowed to be introduced after August 2016 without premarket approval. Since the FDA has not 
ruled on any e-cigarette application yet, in part because continuing legal action made uncertain the 
deadline for their submission, anti-vaping advocates can still truthfully claim that there are no FDA-
approved e-cigarettes on the market.25 In January 2020, the FDA also effectively prohibited sales of any 
flavored cartridge-based e-cigarettes (other than tobacco-, mint-, and menthol-flavored).26 However, 
flavored e-liquids for open-system tank vaping (typically available at vape shops) remain allowed.27 
With e-cigarettes added to the regulatory purview of the FDA, age restrictions on sales to youth 
under age 18 and the prohibition of sales from vending machines came into force in 2016.28 Most states 
had already banned sales to youth before the federal action (see Figure 3), and over time many states 
raised their age restrictions on sales to 19 or 21 years. Near the end of 2019, as mentioned above, the 




Figure 3: The growth of state regulation regarding e-cigarette sales to youth  
States have also been free to impose other regulation upon the sales and usage of e-cigarettes. 
The increasing number of other regulations among the states is depicted in Figure 4. Some states 
require retailers to obtain special licenses to sell e-cigarettes, typically with the goal of limiting youth 
access to vaping products; some place the same restrictions on using the devices in public that smokers 
face (thus applying “smoke-free” rules to a smoke-free product). Finally, a minority of states levies 






Figure 4: The growth of other state regulations regarding e-cigarette sales and usage 
2.3 Upcoming Potential Regulatory Changes  
The FDA is currently undertaking several rulemaking processes on tobacco regulation. One 
regulatory proceeding is considering whether menthol flavoring in cigarettes (other flavors are already 
illegal) will be banned.29 Perhaps the most ambitious regulatory action contemplated by the FDA is to 
lower nicotine in cigarettes to minimally- or non-addictive levels.30 While the FDA does not have the 
authority to ban cigarettes outright, such action would effectively kill the legal market for the product as 
it exists today. Public comments on the latter two proceedings were due in the summer of 2018 but the 
FDA has not issued final rules (or announced that they were abandoning the effort) for either as of the 
start of 2020. 
As discussed in section 2.1, apart from a single heat-not-burn product, the FDA has not issued 
rulings on any of the submissions for regulatory product approval for e-cigarette products. Thus, the 
industry faces a large degree of uncertainty going forward regarding the amount of effort required for 
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successful submissions. The fact that the one approved product, IQOS by Philip Morris International 
(PMI), purportedly required billions of dollars for regulatory compliance on the part of the manufacturer 
and experienced two years of regulatory delay until approval does not bode well for any maker of e-
cigarettes apart from the largest tobacco manufacturers.31  
Although not new regulation per se, the main upcoming regulatory action by the FDA—eagerly 
awaited by industry and the public health community—is a definitive ruling on any of the regulatory 
approvals sought for e-cigarette products, discussed above. It remains to be seen whether any such 
products will be allowed to claim that they are safer than cigarettes or whether they aid in cessation of 
smoking. It is also unclear whether any cartridge-based ENDS products flavored with other than mint or 
menthol will be approved; despite the current sales ban the FDA has not ruled out such products from 
gaining regulatory approval. As mentioned above, the only ruling to date has been on a heat-not-burn 
product, which differs in many ways from traditional vaping products. 
3 Issues involved with taxing and regulating tobacco and e-cigarettes 
3.1 Tobacco 
In this section, the various rationales offered for regulating tobacco and some of the unintended 
consequences of doing so are discussed. 
3.1.1 What are the rationales for taxing and regulating? 
The three main rationales for excise taxes and regulations on tobacco fall into two categories. 
The main economic rationale has traditionally been to tax tobacco to align the private and social costs of 
smoking. The main actual rationale appears to be paternalism. In recent years a hybrid rationale has 
emerged in which theories from behavioral economics are used to justify paternalistic taxation and 
regulation. These are all discussed here. 
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3.1.1.1 The economic rationale: externalities 
The traditional economic rationale for tobacco taxation is to correct consumers’ faulty 
incentives (i.e., taxation to correct for externalities a la Pigou). In other words, the main economic 
rationale for tobacco taxation depends on the presence of negative externalities. 
An externality in this context is an effect of consumption that creates adverse consequences for 
persons other than the decision-maker. So-called Pigovian taxes are set to correct for the externalities, 
so that the consumer considers the costs and benefits of his actions from the social rather than merely 
the personal perspective. The two externalities discussed for consumption of tobacco are the burdens 
imposed on taxpayers (fiscal externalities) and the burdens imposed on non-smokers (health 
externalities).32 When smokers degrade their likely future health by their consumption of tobacco, they 
create future expected costs for publicly funded health programs such as Medicare. However, whether 
it is proper to treat such “fiscal externalities” identically to other externalities in the social calculus is 
debated.33 Externalities require attention and possibly correction because they create inefficiencies, not 
because they transfer benefits from one party to another in the economy. The inefficiencies associated 
with fiscal externalities, however, are due to the inefficiencies inherent in subsidized healthcare, not 
smoking per se. That is, the inefficiency (if any) arises because of the policy (Medicare), not the 
individual’s action (smoking). 
The remaining difficulties with an argument based on fiscal externalities, for those wishing to 
justify large tax rates on cigarettes, are twofold. First, the cost of a pack is borne today (by the buyer) 
but any future external costs for society to fund healthcare are far in the future. The present expected 
discounted value of those future health costs is small, and thus so would be the corrective taxes. (Note, 
however, that if healthcare cost increases continue to outpace general inflation, this first rebuttal loses 
some force.) Second, since smokers on average die younger than nonsmokers, they reduce the drain on 
the public purse for social security payments and have fewer years of eligibility for (costly) Medicare.34 
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Thus it is unsurprising that studies taking these considerations into account while computing the optimal 
tax generally find that current excise tax levels are too high compared to the net externalities.35even 
using an astronomically high figure for the health cost to society of smoking a single pack ($35), the 
optimal tax to correct for negative externalities would be only 40 cents per pack (compared to the actual 
excise tax averaging around $2.80 in 2018).36 The weight of the literature instead finds similarly small 
externalities, but some notable exceptions actually find social savings from smoking (although these 
tend to be countries with higher public expenditure on health than the United States).37   
The other negative externality created by smoking is the burden imposed on non-smokers, 
primarily through second-hand smoke. Such burdens include the annoyance from being exposed to 
others’ smoke and any adverse health effects. Given that “everyone knows” how harmful second-hand 
smoke is, many people would be surprised to learn how weak the scientific evidence used to justify the 
indoor smoke-free laws of the 1990s actually was.38 A landmark study in 1993 from the Environmental 
Protection Agency purported to show the adverse health effects of second-hand smoke and was 
influential in the passage of many local and state smoke-free ordinances. However, the report was 
savaged by a federal court.39 The study, which stated that it reviewed the best available scientific 
evidence at the time, was thrown out by the court in part because it “did not demonstrate a statistically 
significant association between [second-hand tobacco smoke] and lung cancer,” which was its main 
claim. The point of rehearsing the story behind the first smoke-free ordinances is not to suggest that 
second-hand smoke does not have adverse health effects; that link is better established today. Rather, it 
is to note that, as is likely the case with the debate about e-cigarettes today (as will be covered in 
section ), the call to regulate smoking was sustained by political and social factors beyond those 
supported directly by the scientific knowledge at the time.40  
Today, it is estimated that there are about 41,000 deaths per year in the United States 
attributable to second-hand smoke.41 That figure represents about 1.5% of all deaths.42 The negative 
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effects of maternal and passive smoking on infant and child health are considered some of the most 
important negative externalities. 43 Various studies have associated smoking during pregnancy with 
reduced fetal growth, low birth weight, and, later in life, obesity, cardiovascular disease, and respiratory 
ailments. However, it remains the case that some of the links are often weaker than people assume. For 
example, one meta-analysis covering 76 studies on environmental tobacco smoke exposure found that 
there was no statistically significant association between environmental tobacco smoke in the home and 
premature births, low birthweight, spontaneous abortions, or lower APGAR scores at birth.44 On the 
other hand, the same meta-analysis found positive association of secondhand smoke with congenital 
malformations.45 Furthermore, many studies find that anti-smoking regulations are associated with 
better infant and child health.46  
Before leaving the subject of negative externalities, it is important to note that a tax is a blunt 
instrument to reduce environmental tobacco smoke exposure. While the price elasticity of market 
demand for cigarettes is estimated to be around 0.4, implying that a 10% increase in the price reduces 
total consumption in the market by only 4%, other more direct interventions can have much larger 
impacts. For example, if the concern is regarding the health of unborn children in a smoking household, 
then one behavioral intervention—involving advising about health risks, introducing strategies within 
the home to eliminate exposure to smoke, and other aspects—reduced the odds of second-hand smoke 
exposure by one-half.47 From the viewpoint of political economy, it must be recognized that 
policymakers may prefer tobacco taxes to cessation or second-hand smoke behavioral intervention 
programs because the former raises revenue for the state while the latter require public expenditure. 
3.1.1.2 The behavioral rationale: “internalities” 
Since taxes on tobacco may already be too high from the usual point of view of taxing to correct 
for externalities, tobacco control advocates have turned to the recent justifications based on behavioral 
economics that have cropped up in recent years. The non- technical version of this argument proceeds 
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along these lines: Youth are not rationally forward-thinking consumers, and most smokers begin in their 
youth. The former assertion, coupled with the latter empirical observation, and supplemented with 
survey evidence showing that most smokers say that they wished that they had not started smoking,48 
argue for setting aside the usual economic rationales and deciding to “just tax it”, in this view. 
Arguments against this rationale include the observation that (as discussed above) taxes are blunt 
instruments to prevent smoking, especially since many youth do not pay for their cigarettes and in 
particular their first cigarettes.49 The greatest weight of a tax would fall on adults, not youth. 
Furthermore, sales of tobacco to youth are already illegal; if that “infinite tax” does not prevent 
initiation of smoking by youth, then why would a finite tax (especially since both can be evaded, as 
discussed in section 3.1.2.2 below)? The evidence is mixed regarding the impact of cigarette prices on 
youth smoking. At least some studies find that higher prices lower the propensity of youth to smoke,50 
although other research indicates that the actual driver affecting youth’s smoking behavior is anti-
smoking sentiment or regulations in the state rather than prices per se.51 
Extending the behavioral economic rationale for tobacco taxes to adults requires a theory 
involving so-called “internalities,” irrational behavior due to limited self-control or foresight. Such 
theories, when applied to tobacco consumption, assume that there is a “behavioral wedge” between 
the price of the good and the value to the consumer of the last unit consumed.52 Whereas a rational 
consumer (roughly speaking) spends money on a commodity to the point where it is just worth it, in 
terms of satisfaction gained for the price paid, the behavioral wedge implies that the individual 
“overconsumes” the good, even as evaluated by the person’s own preferences. This may happen, for 
example, if youth underestimate the likelihood that they will get addicted and become life-long smokers 
(with all the resulting pecuniary and health costs) when first trying smoking. The result is that, 
theoretically, increasing a price by increasing an excise tax actually increases the person’s welfare. Thus 
a tax helps “nudge” a consumer toward an outcome that is better for that person, in the estimation of 
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that person. One study adopting this approach arrived at an “optimal” tax to correct for internalities 
would be up to $15 per pack (!), which is far higher than any tax in the nation. Thus the behavioral 
approach is convenient for parties advocating for higher tobacco taxes. 
3.1.1.3 The paternalistic rationale 
As is clear from the discussion of the behavioral rationale, many policy analysts and policy 
makers approach the subject of tobacco regulation with a heavy dose of paternalism, viewing smokers 
as faulty decision-makers who need to be saved from their poor choices. Some authors are quite explicit 
about this; for example, one behavioral economic study performed for a lung cancer group states that 
“…we will focus on failures of individual self-control which lead to excessive smoking relative to desired 
levels. In such a case, tobacco taxation can provide a corrective force to combat failures of self-
control.”53 In this approach, the power of the state to tax provides a corrective force to nudge (or shove) 
irrational, tricked, or self-deluded smokers toward cessation. 
Paternalism is a comfortable position for many policy makers to adopt, since given smoking’s 
negative correlation with income and education relatively few of them smoke today. As Kip Viscusi has 
pointed out, since they chose not to smoke it is therefore easy for them to assume that smokers are 
mistaken, irrational, or in need of policy nudges toward cessation.54 Of course, just because a behavior is 
hard to quit, it does not necessarily follow that the choice to begin was irrational (as most coffee 
drinkers would attest).55 Furthermore, assumed faulty choices based on mistaken perceptions of the 
health effects of smoking appear to be unlikely, since if anything the American public overestimates the 
risks of smoking today.56 (The evidence on whether youth in particular hold correct perceptions of the 
risks from smoking is mixed, however.)57  
Evidence for intertemporal irrationality and time inconsistency in decision-making (by which 
economists mean that your future self will regret decisions made by your present self) comes mainly 
from lab experiments. These are typically performed on college students at elite universities, hardly a 
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representative demographic. There is also a small empirical literature which claims to find time 
inconsistency in real-world economic decisions (other than smoking).58 Such apparent irrationality, of 
course, follows from individuals in the data not making the choices that the economic theorists think 
that they should after estimating impressively technical yet still restrictive models of choice; it remains 
to be seen how robust these findings will be to more realistic models of economic behavior based on 
less restrictive assumptions. 
While the arguments for paternalistic action by the state thus assume that smokers “need help 
helping themselves,” arguments for less paternalism can be based on normative and positive grounds.59 
Normative ideas include those that the proper role of government is to protect the liberty of the citizens 
regarding, inter alia, economic decisions, and that (absent compelling reasons to the contrary) 
individuals should be free to make choices without governmental interference. Conversely, even 
granting the premise of limited cognition and the desire to optimize the behavior of individuals who 
cannot do so themselves, bounded rationality can raise the costs of government decision-making 
relative to private decision-making.60 Positive arguments against paternalistic tobacco taxes are based 
on the unintended consequences that they can cause. For example, evidence from the 1990s indicated 
that higher prices caused smokers to switch to cigarettes that were higher in tar and nicotine, and 
therefore more harmful and addictive.61 Other unintended consequences are covered in the next 
section.62 
3.1.2 Unintended consequences from taxes and regulations 
An effective approach to policy must focus less on what policymakers hope will happen and 
more on what is likely to happen. This takes us into the realm of unintended consequences. 
3.1.2.1 Tax equity  
A standard desideratum for taxation is equity, based on the ability-to-pay principle. This 
principle leads to the system of progressive income taxation in the United States, for example. However, 
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excise taxes on cigarettes are regressive: poorer individuals spend a greater share of their income on 
consumption, and therefore an excise tax takes a greater share portion of a poor person’s income than 
it does of a wealthy person. Furthermore, cigarette smoking is more prevalent among lower-income 
groups in the United States. These facts compound to make tobacco taxes doubly regressive.63 While 
tobacco taxes may constitute only a small part of the total financial burden facing most smokers, in 
some cases the tax burden could be onerous. Consider, as an extreme example, a full-time minimum 
wage worker in Chicago, where combined federal, state, county, and local tobacco taxes during the 
second half of 2019 were $8.17 per pack.64 During that period, the taxes alone on a pack-a-day smoking 
habit would have taken up 12% of the individual’s gross wages.65 
If higher taxes encouraged many low-income individuals to quit smoking, then one could argue 
that the regressive impact of tobacco taxes would be blunted or removed entirely. The evidence for the 
predicate is weak, however. While there is evidence that higher prices lead to there being fewer 
smokers, even among the low-income population, evidence for a link between prices and cessation is 
less clear (in part because cessation is harder to study than smoking prevalence). One study found that 
there is no correlation between cigarette prices in the state and successful cessation among smokers 
below the poverty line, either in bivariate analysis or after controlling for other factors.66 Low-income 
individuals who still smoke tend to be hard-core smokers whose behavior is difficult to change; taxing 
them simply raises their financial burdens if they do not quit.67 The indirect evidence for higher taxes 
leading to cessation is stronger: several studies show that tax increases lead to a lower smoking 
prevalence among older smokers.68 Given that few people begin smoking once out of their 20s, a lower 
prevalence among older smokers is indicative of cessation.69 Regardless, another study found that even 
when accounting for the different sensitivity among income groups of smoking to prices, cigarette tax 
increases remain regressive.70 
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Proponents of higher tobacco taxes often respond to the regressivity argument by arguing that 
revenue from the taxes should be directed toward cessation programs intended to help low-income 
smokers quit or to relieve their financial burdens.71 The former may be an admirable intention, but as 
mentioned above less than three percent of current tobacco tax and MSA payments are spent on 
cessation.72 The latter is an odd argument, since no scheme taxing a subset of the poor could result in 
net financial gains for those taxed. A final open question regarding the equity of taxes is whether the 
health benefits of reduced smoking accrue disproportionately to lower income individuals and families. 
If so, the direct regressivity of the taxes would be attenuated (or even reversed) by the offsetting health 
benefits. 
3.1.2.2 Illicit trade 
As stated in a leading economics textbook on public finance, “markets do not take taxes lying 
down.”73 Furthermore, “the avoidance of taxes is the only pursuit that still carries any reward” 
(attributed to John Maynard Keynes). A large body of research indicates that increasing tobacco taxes 
can have the unintended consequence of stimulating illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP).74 In this 
country, most ITTP takes the form of legitimately manufactured cigarettes that are transported between 
states to be sold illicitly, avoiding state and local excise taxes at the point of retail sale. ITTP can also 
involve counterfeit cigarettes, untaxed sales from Native American reservations, illicit whites (cigarettes 
legal in the country of manufacture but intended for illegal sales in other markets), and gray market re-
imported goods.75 ITTP is big business. The National Academy of Sciences found in 2017 that illicit sales 
compose between 8.5 percent and 21 percent of the total market for cigarettes in the United States. 
This range represents between 1.24 to 2.91 billion packs of cigarettes annually and between $2.95 
billion and $6.92 billion in lost gross state and local tax revenues.”76 Worldwide, the avoided taxes from 
ITTP are estimated to be in the tens of billions of dollars per year, putting ITTP in the same financial class 
as the global traffic in illicit drugs.77 
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The economic explanation for ITTP is simple: licit and illicit cigarettes are substitutes, and when 
the tax-inclusive price of the licit good rises, some users will switch to the illicit substitute. The degree to 
which tax increases and tax differentials among states and localities cause substitution toward ITTP 
depends on many factors, including the rule of law, enforcement at customs borders and at points of 
sale, the ease of access to illicit sources, the price differential between licit and illicit cigarettes, and the 
moral sentiments of the smoker.78  
While the basic fact that an increase in taxes leads to more ITTP, holding other factors constant, 
is generally accepted by most economists, there is much disagreement over the policy implications. If 
tax rates across states were unified, then presumably raising a unified rate would not stimulate as much 
ITTP as raising an already high local tax (such as in Chicago or New York City) given the large role that 
interstate tax arbitrage currently plays.79 Some in the public health community downplay any suggestion 
that taxes are linked to ITTP, dismissing the argument through guilt by association, since the tobacco 
industry makes this claim.80 Others argue that either the effects are small or that other measures can be 
taken to combat illicit trade.81 Careful empirical investigation has shown, however, that raising taxes can 
lead to sizeable increases in ITTP.82 Notwithstanding, the evidence is clear that in most cases ITTP may 
erode but does not reverse revenue gains from increased taxes. Similarly, taxes do decrease 
consumption, even though ITTP may attenuate the amount by which it does so.83  
Before leaving the subject of ITTP, it is important to note that it creates additional harms to 
health. Counterfeit cigarettes have been shown to contain pesticides, human and animal waste, heavy 
metals, and other harmful substances.84 Furthermore, law enforcement directed at ITTP can create 
other harms, including those from incarceration and violence, given the well-known link between 




The main issues surrounding vaping concern its safety, its relationship to smoking and whether 
it is a promising avenue for harm reduction, and unintended consequences from regulation and 
taxation. Harm reduction refers to policies and approaches aimed at reducing the harms from an 
addictive substance, but not the use of the substance per se.86 The viewpoint of harm reduction is 
widely accepted in the public health community for alcohol and illicit drugs, but it is controversial in the 
tobacco control community, mainly because of guilt by association with Big Tobacco, which “has been 
seen by some to lead the harm reduction push (through the development of new nicotine delivery 
devices).”87 Thus in traditional tobacco control the importance of abstinence is taken as the goal rather 
than finding safer ways to consume nicotine. The rejection of harm reduction as a guiding philosophy is 
sometimes justified with reference to the precautionary principle, which posits that lack of scientific 
certainty should not delay action to regulate or ban new products such as e-cigarettes.88  
Notwithstanding, the discussion to follow examines the issue through the lens of harm reduction and 
whether e-cigarettes could be part of such an approach. 
3.2.1 Is vaping safer than smoking? 
What many consider to be the most important question is the easiest to answer. Because they 
do not involve combustion, and because the combustion of the organic material in a cigarette creates 
nearly all the health hazards, it would be surprising indeed if e-cigarettes were found to be as risky for 
health as smoking. This simple expectation has been greatly muddied in the public mind by certain 
public health advocates who hold a priori goals of abstinence for both smoking and vaping. Thus a 
review of the state of current knowledge on this topic is useful. 
To begin with, from the standpoint of harm reduction, the question is not whether e-cigarettes 
pose no health risks at all (except perhaps for the question of initiation by youth, a question to which we 
will return below). In the context of the public health disaster caused by smoking, the proper first 
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question must be whether e-cigarettes are safer than cigarettes, and to what degree. Before delving 
into the literature, it is useful to know that after considering the state of the evidence, the official health 
ministry of England declared that vaping is at least 95% less harmful to health than smoking.89 The 
purpose of Public Health England’s statement in 2015 was not to present a precise risk multiple but 
instead to effectively encourage smokers who have been unable to quit by other methods to switch to 
vaping instead of smoking.90  
E-liquids and vapor contain substances known to be harmful to human health when inhaled, 
including irritants, carcinogens, and particulates (Cheng, 2014). Then again, much of modern life exposes 
individuals to harmful substances. Thus the question is what the short- and long-term health effects 
from such exposure are and how they compare with those from smoking. One difficulty in discussing the 
health effects of “vaping” is the great multiplicity of products; there is no “standard” vapor, 
concentration of chemicals in e-liquids, or intensity of inhalation. Notwithstanding, one study found that 
along the spectrum of products tested, the preponderance of products produced vapor with cancer 
potencies of less than 1% of tobacco smoke.91 Having fewer harmful substances in the vapor leads to 
fewer in the body. Another study concluded that switching completely from cigarettes to e-cigarettes 
“substantially reduced levels of measured carcinogens and toxins” in the body.92 Overall, the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on e-cigarettes found that “there is conclusive evidence that 
completely substituting e-cigarettes for combustible tobacco cigarettes reduces users’ exposure to 
numerous toxicants and carcinogens present in combustible tobacco cigarettes.”93 
Perhaps the strongest case against vaping on grounds of deleterious health effects would be 
based on respiratory disease, since exposure to particulates and flavorings in e-cigarette vapor could 
potentially impair the function of the lungs. Several studies find that vaping can cause acute respiratory 
symptoms such as coughing and wheezing, particularly among adolescents. Some of these studies do 
not control for concurrent or past smoking; controlling for these confounding factors can remove some 
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of the positive associations between vaping and respiratory symptoms.94 Even here, however, the recent 
National Academy of Sciences report concluded that “there is no available evidence whether or not e-
cigarettes cause respiratory diseases in humans.”95 Conversely, the same report found “limited 
evidence” for improvement in symptoms from asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD) when smokers who suffered from those ailments switched completely to vaping. Summarizing 
evidence concerning a variety of potential ill health effects, the NAS report found that there is 
“substantial evidence that completely switching from regular use of combustible tobacco cigarettes to e-
cigarettes results in reduced short-term adverse health outcomes in several organ systems”, including 
the respiratory system.  
To conclude, while there is great uncertainty about the long-term effects of vaping, the answer 
to whether using e-cigarettes is better for health than smoking is almost surely “yes”. When viewed 
along the continuum of health risk for nicotine delivery methods, e-cigarettes appear to be much closer 
to nicotine replacement therapies than to smoking. However, the strongest conclusions for the 
supremacy of e-cigarettes over cigarettes regarding health effects are reached for users who switch 
completely away from smoking. There is no available evidence whether long-term e-cigarette use 
among dual users (i.e., those who continue to smoke) changes morbidity or mortality compared to 
smokers who do not vape.96 
3.2.2 Do e-cigarettes aid in cessation? 
Is vaping a useful aid to help smokers quit smoking, or does it just prolong the habit by allowing 
smokers another way to consume nicotine when they are temporarily unable to smoke? It appears likely 
that e-cigarettes would be a more appealing cessation aid than nicotine replacement therapies (NRTs) 
such as patches, gum, or lozenges, given the sensory and behavioral similarity of vaping to smoking. The 
scientific literature on e-cigarettes and cessation is still in its early stages; given the novelty of vaping no 
long-term studies on e-cigarettes and cessation have been performed. However, the initial literature is 
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mainly encouraging. A review of existing studies conducted in 2015 found that, overall, use of e-
cigarettes was positively associated with both cessation of smoking and reduction in the intensity of 
smoking (for those who did not quit).97 A more recent review of studies on cessation came to a similar 
conclusion, but only after excluding numerous published studies that did not meet standard levels of 
quality for scientific research in medicine or public health.98 The latter meta-analysis found that rates of 
smoking cessation with e‐cigarettes were generally similar to rates of cessation with NRT, while the 
former found e-cigarettes to be twice as effective as NRT.99 Some research conducted after these 
reviews also supports the role that e-cigarettes can play in cessation.100 
3.2.3 Are kids getting addicted to e-cigarettes?  
There have been many dire, headline-grabbing reports issued in recent years referring to the 
“vaping epidemic” among youth. For example, many variations on the headline that “teen vaping surges 
to more than one in four students” appeared in 2019.101 However, the publicized prevalence of 27% 
pertains to using an e-cigarette once or more during the past 30 days among high-school students. 
There is clearly a lot of casual use among high-schoolers, since their prevalence of substantial use of e-
cigarettes (defined as use on 20 or more days out of the past 30) is less than 10%.102 
Furthermore, substantial use of e-cigarettes is mostly confined to youth who already smoke. 
Among students who had never tried any actual tobacco product in 2018, the prevalence of substantial 
use of e-cigarettes was found to be only 1.0% in another study.103 For such never-smokers, only 3.8% 
reported craving and only 3.1% reported wanting to use an e-cigarette within 30 minutes of waking. 
Combined with evidence that most dual-using high-schoolers began with smoking, not vaping (see the 
next section), the article concludes that the data “do not support claims of a new epidemic of nicotine 
addiction stemming from use of e-cigarettes.”104 Nevertheless, however measured the prevalence of 
vaping continues to rise among youth, and as such it will require continued monitoring. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that not all youth vaping represents net health harms to the individual 
and society, given that in a counterfactual “no e-cigarettes” world some young vapers would be smokers 
instead (or, in the case of dual use, potentially heavier smokers). The relationship between vaping and 
smoking is discussed next. 
3.2.4 Does vaping lead to smoking among youth? 
The findings discussed in the previous section that most e-cigarette use is by smokers leads to 
the question of which came first. Does vaping lead to smoking (the “gateway hypothesis”), or do 
underage smokers just find vaping a convenient (and likely cheaper)105 way to consume nicotine while at 
school or elsewhere? First, it should be noted that many of the claims that e-cigarette use “causes” 
smoking are based on nothing more than the observation in population studies that many youth are 
dual users. However, it is likely that part of the association between vaping and smoking among youth is 
due to smoking leading to vaping. Another large part of the association is likely due to underlying 
(confounding) factors (such as a desire for risk-taking or exposure to smoking family members or peers) 
that make a youth more likely to vape and smoke.106  
Given that randomized controlled trials involving exposure to vaping performed on youth are 
unethical, evidence can only come from observational studies of the population. Such studies, however, 
are inescapably beset by potential confounding factors. Population studies can control for certain 
observable demographic and behavioral confounders. Studies doing so that follow youth over time who 
do not initially smoke find that there is, in the estimation of the NAS report, “substantial evidence” that 
e-cigarette use increases the risk of trying cigarettes among youth and young adults. However, it is 
impossible to control for all of the many genetic, behavioral, psychological, and environmental factors 
that surely must influence the propensities to smoke and vape, and none of the studies use econometric 
techniques designed to give some assurance that causal effects were identified. Some researchers, 
therefore, conclude that the association between vaping and smoking is more likely to be spurious than 
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to be evidence of the gateway hypothesis.107 As better data and more sophisticated statistical 
techniques are brought to bear on this question, it may be hoped that greater confidence can be placed 
on one conclusion or the other. 
If the conclusion in the NAS report is statistically meaningful, one would expect that as vaping 
among youth has risen, so would have youth smoking rates. This is not the case, however. Simply put, 
youth smoking initiation has been falling while the prevalence of vaping has been rising. A recent trend 
analysis of the relationship between vaping and youth smoking found that “while trying electronic 
cigarettes may causally increase smoking among some youth, the aggregate effect at the population 
level appears to be negligible.”108 Furthermore, the criterion of temporal precedence for causality states 
that if vaping causes smoking, then vaping must come before smoking. However, for the great majority 
of high school smokers, cigarettes were tried before any use of e-cigarettes.109 In 2014, only 2% of 
current high-school age e-cigarette users who had smoked at least 25 cigarettes in their lifetimes said 
that they began with e-cigarettes. In 2015, that proportion had risen but was still only between 8% and 
15%.110 
Another way to pose the question is whether restrictions on youth access to e-cigarettes will 
decrease smoking. The scant evidence on this subject appears to point to the opposite conclusion. 
Imposing minimum age laws for sales of e-cigarettes increased youth smoking participation by about 
one percentage point, which suggests that some youth who otherwise would have purchased e-
cigarettes either began smoking or failed to quit.111 Evidence in a similar vein comes from another study 
of underage rural girls: laws restricting sales of e-cigarettes to youth increased the prevalence of 
smoking by during pregnancy by 0.6 percentage points, with evidence indicating the cause to be 
reduced cessation of smoking.112 Given that the goal of minimum age laws is not just to discourage 




3.2.5 Will the new federal minimum age law reduce youth vaping?  
Young people between 18 and 21 years of age could legally purchase e-cigarettes in the majority 
of states at the beginning of 2019 (see ), whereas none of them could a year later. How much the new 
age restrictions will reduce vaping among youth is as yet unknown. Based on previous experience with 
tobacco minimum age laws, we should expect that without enforcement the new law will have little to 
no effect on underage use.113 With enforcement, it is natural to expect that youth vaping would decline 
at least to some extent, if experience with earlier tobacco laws and youth smoking can be a guide.114  
However, several factors suggest that the minimum age laws will not eliminate use by underage 
vapers. First, most youth do not buy their own e-cigarettes at retail stores, since in most places those 
under 18 have already been disallowed from legal purchase since 2016; acquiring e-cigarettes from 
social sources (e.g., friends and family) is much more common.115 However, the hope of those raising 
the legal purchasing age is that younger teens will have fewer members of their social sourcing networks 
who are over 21. Second, many youth who vape have already demonstrated willingness to break the 
law. Over two-fifths of youth who use e-cigarettes report vaping THC, which is illegal for youth even in 
states that legalized cannabis.116 Finally, even in relatively high enforcement states such as California, 7% 
of stores were willing to sell e-cigarettes illegally to underage vapers.117 This latter finding is in accord 
with research showing that the majority (75%) of underage smokers who attempt to purchase tobacco 
in the US are not refused because of age.118 
3.2.6 Does vaping create externalities?  
As discussed in section 3.1.1.1 above, a classic argument for taxing tobacco rests on health 
harms created by second-hand smoke. What about second-hand exposure to vapor from e-cigarettes, or 
even third-hand exposure to chemical residue that settles from vapor onto surfaces? If second and 
third-hand exposure created large health harms, then taxes on e-cigarettes and restrictions on where 
they can be used may be justified. Given that the health harms of vaping are not yet known with 
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precision, it is unsurprising that the secondary and tertiary health impact are also largely unknown, at 
least in the sense that no “optimal tax” can be calculated yet to align private and social incentives. One 
systematic review of the scientific literature led to no stronger a statement than that second- and third-
hand exposure to vapor from e-cigarettes has “the potential to lead to adverse health effects” 
(emphasis added).119 The influential NAS report concluded that using an e-cigarette indoors “may 
involuntarily expose non-users to nicotine and particulates” but also that the effects of such exposure 
remains unknown.120 More certain than any health risk from exposure to others’ vapor is that it is likely 
to be less harmful than second-hand smoke. The two studies just cited state that the “risk from being 
passively exposed to … vapor is likely to be less than the risk from passive exposure to conventional 
cigarette smoke” and that there is “moderate evidence that secondhand exposure to nicotine and 
particulates is lower from e-cigarettes compared with combustible tobacco cigarettes.”121 
3.2.7 Do restrictions on advertising tobacco apply to e-cigarettes? Should they? 
Many of the restrictions on advertising tobacco do not apply to e-cigarettes, since the most 
important restrictions—most notably, the ban on advertising cigarettes on television and radio—are not 
FDA regulations. When the FDA deemed e-cigarettes to be tobacco products (see section 2.2), any 
regulations promulgated by that agency thenceforth applied to e-cigarettes. Thus, since 2018, by federal 
law all advertisements for e-cigarettes must display the warning that “This product contains nicotine 
derived from tobacco. Nicotine is an addictive chemical.” The notice must occupy at least 20 percent of 
the area of the advertisement.122 However, there is no federal law against advertising e-cigarettes on 
television, radio, websites, billboards, public transportation, and other outdoor venues, whereas these 
are prohibited in most of the U.S. for cigarettes.123 Some states, however, ban advertising of e-cigarettes 
on billboards. 
Whether advertising of e-cigarettes helps or hinders public health depends on how youth and 
adults respond to advertising, the health effects of vaping, and whether smokers use e-cigarettes to aid 
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cessation. One recent study found that viewing television (but not magazine) advertising of e-cigarettes 
encouraged smokers to quit, with most of the effect due to greater success per quit attempt rather than 
an increase in attempts. The authors estimate that 3% of the decrease in the prevalence of adult 
smoking is due to television advertising. This evidence, which the authors call “tentative” since it was 
gathered from a relatively short period (two years of data), should give policymakers pause before 
considering indiscriminate bans on  advertising of e-cigarettes. Whether and how ads targeted or 
particularly attractive to youth can be prevented without banning all advertising remains an open 
question, both for vaping and for other goods such as alcohol.124 
3.2.8 What about the recent health scares involving vaping and lung illness? 
In mid-2019, a spate of visits to emergency rooms across the country linked vaping to acute lung 
injuries, and the government responded promptly—by created an acronym for the phenomenon: e-
cigarette/vaping-associated lung injury (EVALI). While by the end of the year the tide of cases of illness 
and death from EVALI appeared to be receding, the highly publicized events raised the issue of the 
health effects of e-cigarettes to prominence in the public’s eye. As of the time of writing, officials are 
still investigating the causes of EVALI, and given that products of questionable legality appear to be 
involved in many cases the true causes may never be nailed down. However, here is what seems to be 
known at the present. 
As of January 20, 2020, there were 2,711 hospitalizations and 60 deaths connected with 
EVALI.125 The emergency room visits rose sharply in August 2019 and peaked in September. Note that 
since the prevalence of e-cigarette usage that been growing smoothly and steadily since at least 2006, a 
suddenly appearing (and declining) epidemic such as EVALI cannot logically be caused by vaping in 
general. The best current guess as to the cause of EVALI centers around vitamin E acetate, a chemical 
added to e-cigarettes containing THC (loosely speaking, “marijuana vapes”). In government tests, 48 of 
51 EVALI patients examined had vitamin E acetate in their lung fluid, compared to none found in a 
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comparison group of 99 healthy people.126 Of the roughly 2,000 EVALI patients for whom data were 
available, 82% reported using THC-containing products; given that such products are illegal in some 
places under state law and illegal everywhere under federal law, this percentage is undoubtedly lower 
than the actual proportion of THC vapers. Of those using such THC-containing products, 84% reported 
acquiring products from informal sources: friends, dealers, off the street, or online sellers; all other than 
physical commercial sources such as dispensaries and vape shops. Furthermore, the most commonly 
used brand in a sample of 86 EVALI patients was a generic THC cartridge made by multiple unregulated 
makers and sold on the black market.127 
While some public health officials seized upon the epidemic as evidence that vaping in general is 
deleterious to health, the official recommendations from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) (at the time of writing) are to avoid vaping THC, avoid the additive vitamin E acetate, be aware of 
“the wide range of health effects” associated with THC use, and to seek help for abuse of cannabis by a 
healthcare professional. In particular, the CDC specifically warns against returning to smoking instead of 
vaping for those who quit smoking or are trying to quit. 
3.2.9 If we heavily regulate, tax, or ban e-cigarettes, what might be the unintended consequences? 
Some of the potential unintended consequences of over-regulating e-cigarettes are similar to 
those discussed for the case of tobacco (see section 3.1.2 above), while others differ. The tax equity 
issue due to the regressivity of excise taxation remains, although not doubly so, since it is not the case 
that lower income individuals are more likely to vape.128 The more important consideration are the 
health consequences of discouraging use of a nicotine product at the lower end of the continuum of risk 
and the potential for black-market substitution. 
3.2.9.1 Harm reduction and the continuum of risk 
The harm reduction (as opposed to the abstinence) approach to tobacco control views tobacco 
and nicotine-containing products as lying along a continuum of risk.129 Combustible products, most 
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notably cigarettes, pose the greatest hazards, while nicotine replacement therapies pose the least. 
Some public health authorities embracing the harm reduction approach, perhaps most notably Public 
Health England, place e-cigarettes close to the low-risk end of the continuum. The key question for harm 
reduction is what will happen if e-cigarettes are banned, heavily taxed, or saddled with overly 
burdensome regulation? If more people continue to smoke instead of switching to vaping or quitting, 
then the evidence reviewed above indicates that it is highly likely that public health would suffer. Per-
unit or ad valorem taxation of e-cigarettes may also encourage substitution toward products with higher 
concentrations of nicotine, which may increase health harms for youth.130 On the other hand, if vaping 
renormalizes smoking and increases initiation among youth, public health could suffer in the future. 
Discussion of these consequences continues in the next section. 
3.2.9.2 Illicit trade 
Given the relative novelty of vaping, illicit trade in e-cigarette products (ITEP) is much less 
studied than ITTP.131 Apparently a thriving black market in counterfeit e-cigarettes already exists, 
although the prevalence is unknown and claims by manufacturers may be overstated. A worrisome 
feature of counterfeit e-liquids is the uncertainty of what they contain; one study found that many of 
them contain nicotine even when labeled as zero-nicotine products.132 Black-market THC vaping 
products have been found to contain pesticides, heavy metals, and lead, and counterfeit nicotine e-
liquids have been traced to illicit, unsanitary facilities in China.133 Packaging and supplies to assemble 
counterfeit vaping products are readily available online.134 The barriers to entry the market for 
counterfeit products therefore seem to be low. As in any other market, as taxes or sales restrictions on 
licit product rise, substitution by some users to illicit sources should be expected, although the 
sensitivity of ITEP to taxation has not been explored yet. 
There is another important aspect linking regulation of e-cigarettes to illicit trade, however. 
When e-cigarettes are readily available to smokers at reasonable prices, they offer smokers an attractive 
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alternative to buying illicit tobacco products to reduce the costs of consuming nicotine. E-cigarettes 
could thus attenuate the link between higher cigarette taxes and stricter regulations on traditional 
tobacco products and ITTP. An econometric study found empirical support for this hypothesis.135 Using 
data from Europe, econometric analysis showed that in places lacking availability of e-cigarettes, there 
was a sizeable, statistically significant positive relationship between tax increases for cigarettes and ITTP. 
However, the availability of e-cigarettes attenuated the size of that link: “the more available e-cigarettes 
become, the less the ITTP market share rises in response to tax-driven price increases for conventional 
cigarettes.”136 In places where e-cigarette markets are large enough, cigarette prices no longer have any 
significant effect on illicit trade.  
4 Steps Toward Better Regulation 
If more were understood about the actual health effects of vaping and exactly what the 
relationships were among the prices of tobacco, e-cigarettes, vaping, and youth initiation of smoking, 
and furthermore it were agreed upon whether vapers and smokers need to be “saved from themselves” 
due to irrational choices, then in principal one could compute optimal prices for tobacco and e-
cigarettes and levy taxes to achieve them. Complicating the analysis are the additional factors discussed 
above regarding the relationships among the price of tobacco, the price and attractiveness of vaping, 
and illicit trade. Furthermore, policymakers would also have to decide whether and how to weigh the 
equity considerations raised by tobacco taxation. Given the great uncertainty in the precise degree to 
which vaping is safer than smoker, no such tax rates can be computed at present. However, although a 
“first best” regulatory policy toward tobacco and vapor cannot be determined, there are sensible steps 
that can be taken that are likely to be in the right direction. 
For tobacco, difficult and honest discussion needs to take place about the role of high rates of 
excise taxation. Given the evidence discussed above that current tax rates are higher than those 
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required to correct for externalities and that the burden falls heavily on low-income individuals, the 
remaining rationales for taxation rest on paternalism, whether dressed in the clothing of behavioral 
economics or not.137 How much of the desire of states and localities to tax tobacco stems from the ease 
of raising revenue from a socially disfavored minority?  
Regarding e-cigarettes, the following seven recommendations can guide policymakers toward 
better regulation. First, the overriding principle to shape thinking about regulating tobacco and e-
cigarettes should be risk-proportionate regulation.138 Products that are not as harmful to health should 
be regulated less stringently, taxed at lower levels, or even encouraged if they aid in cessation of 
tobacco use. By deeming e-cigarettes to be “tobacco products,” the FDA created a setting that 
prompted all the anti-tobacco crusading zeal to be indiscriminately directed at vaping as well. But since 
vaping is almost surely less harmful to health than smoking, the regulatory touch should also be lighter.  
Second, the tendencies among the public health community in the United States to understate 
the likely health benefits of switching from cigarettes to e-cigarettes should be curbed. Sometimes this 
happens through confusing the absolute risk from vaping (which is often characterized in more certain 
or inflated terms than the current state of the science warrants) with the relative risk of vaping versus 
smoking (since e-cigarettes may have some health harms, “therefore” it is no better than smoking). The 
approach of anti-vaping advocates among the public health community to jump from the uncertainty in 
the scientific literature to statements implying that e-cigarettes could be comparably risky or even more 
dangerous than cigarettes, while technically true since long-term health effects are unknown, is highly 
misleading.139 Such statements have helped convince many members of the public to hold potentially 
dangerous attitudes about the relative health harms of smoking and vaping. Surveys indicate that today 
the majority of Americans believe e-cigarettes are just as harmful as cigarettes, and about 10 percent 
think that vaping is more dangerous than smoking.140 Fewer than 3% of adults think that e-cigarettes are 
much less harmful than cigarettes.141 These negative perceptions of e-cigarettes have grown rapidly in 
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recent years. This is concerning, given that the perceived risk of smoking relative to vaping is known to 
affect the decision to use e-cigarettes.142 
Third, and related to the previous point, the uncertainty regarding the health effects of e-
cigarettes should not be used to discourage smokers to switch. The personal negative health impacts 
from smoking are large and well-studied. Switching completely away from such a harmful activity to an 
activity that is very likely to be less harmful—even if the degree of relative risk is uncertain—is likely to 
improve the health prospects of the switcher (refer to section 3.2.1 above). The potential costs to public 
health of discouraging smokers to switch to e-cigarettes are high. One study found that compared to the 
status quo, replacement of cigarette by e-cigarette use over a 10-year period would result in 1.6 to 
6.6 million fewer premature deaths and 20.8 to 86.7 million fewer years of life lost.143 
Fourth, given the potential benefits to adult smokers from switching to e-cigarettes and the 
potential harms to youth from taking up vaping or, in consequence, smoking, targeting regulation 
narrowly at youth may be better than blunt, broadly applied rules. Thus the current age limits on 
purchases of e-cigarettes are mainly uncontroversial, as are the FDA’s enforcement against e-liquids 
designed to resemble child-friendly food products or future restrictions on advertising aimed at youth. 
Of course, youth-oriented restrictions may prevent some young people who already smoke from 
switching to a less harmful product, since most smokers began their habit before age 18 (and recall that 
the age restriction for e-cigarette sales is now 21). Tobacco control expenditure on campaigns and 
information to alert youth to the potential dangers of vaping, in principle, are also relatively 
uncontroversial, since nicotine may have adverse health effects on adolescents that it does not for 
adults.144 However, as with any abstinence campaign, it is likely that some youth will reject such 
messages, particularly if they sense that the claims are overblown or manipulative. Given the absence of 
solid knowledge about adverse health effects, some youth-oriented anti-vaping messages instead rely 
on false syllogisms along the lines of “Big Tobacco wants you to vape, and tobacco kills, therefore vaping 
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will kill you.” Others attempt to parlay the recent epidemic of EVAPI into messages not to use licit 
products such as Juul and other commercially available, non-THC e-cigarettes, which (given the current 
but evolving knowledge reviewed in section 3.2.7) does not appear to be a supportable conclusion.145 It 
is an open question why the same public health  community that rejects fear-based anti-drug messages 
as ineffective or, worse, causing a boomerang effect146  embraces them for the anti-vaping crusade.  
Fifth, given the benefits of targeting regulation toward youth, heavily taxing e-cigarettes is not 
likely to be in the best interests of public health. As discussed previously, a tax (or any general regulation 
affecting all ages of users) is a very blunt instrument. While some youth may be deterred from using e-
cigarettes by higher prices, given the apparently large current appetite for black-market vapes that the 
EVAPI epidemic revealed, coupled with the evidence from tobacco taxes and ITTP, it seems highly likely 
that high taxes on e-cigarettes will drive more youth demand toward less reputable and potentially 
much more dangerous sources. In any event, sales to those under 21 years of age are already banned, 
which is equivalent to an infinitely high tax that applies only to youth. Furthermore, burdening adult 
smokers with high taxes will discourage some of them from switching to vaping, to the likely detriment 
of their health. Indeed, if e-cigarettes are viewed as a form of nicotine-replacement therapy, there 
might even be a case for subsidizing them for smokers attempting cessation (as NRTs are subsidized 
through private health insurance and various public programs) rather than taxing them. Thus, proposed 
legislation such as the “E-Cigarette Tax Parity Act,” which seeks to tax nicotine equally regardless of the 
mode of delivery, not only almost certainly violate the principle of risk-proportionate regulation but also 
may be harmful to public health.147 
Sixth, careful consideration of whether banning the use of e-cigarettes in public spaces is 
appropriate is warranted. As reviewed above, it is far more certain that switching from smoking to 
vaping is beneficial for the health of the user than it is that e-cigarettes create substantial health harms 
from secondary exposure. But the ability to use e-cigarettes to consume nicotine, even if only in 
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designated areas, while at work or in public spaces could be a powerful incentive for a smoker to switch. 
On the flip side, the ability to consume nicotine more easily may also prevent or delay some smokers 
from cessation (the “dual use” case). More study will be required in this regard, but it is not at all clear 
that excessive caution is better than cautious optimism regarding the social costs and benefits of vaping 
bans in public and work spaces. Banning vaping where smoking is banned also sends the message that 
the two activities are equally harmful, which relates back to the second and third points discussed 
above. 
Seventh, efforts toward resolving the regulatory uncertainty at the federal level should receive 
high importance. The FDA currently states that “no ENDS products have been authorized by the FDA — 
meaning that all ENDS products currently on the market are considered illegally marketed and are 
subject to enforcement, at any time, in the FDA’s discretion.”148 Yet the agency has so far allowed sales 
of commercial nicotine e-cigarette products, as long as there is no sales or marketing to youth. The 
current regulatory environment is thus one in which the industry, and the specific manufacturers and 
retailers in the industry, are subject to a higher degree of regulatory dependence and uncertainty than 
most other industries. The negative effects of regulatory uncertainty and regulatory delay on investment 
and product innovation are well studied in other industries.149 If e-cigarettes aid cessation or otherwise 
reduce harms from smoking, then innovation in that product space should be encouraged rather than 
discouraged. 
Finally, in regards to both tobacco and e-cigarettes, serious attention must be paid to the 
interplay between taxation, regulation, and illicit markets. If e-cigarettes are inexpensive, attractive to 
users, easy to obtain, and able to be used in places where smoking is forbidden, then there will be a 
lower likelihood that current smokers will turn to the black market when faced with higher taxes or 
increased restrictions.150 Because the argument that higher taxes stimulate ITTP is convenient for 
tobacco manufacturers lobbying for lower tax rates, the public health community has a long history of 
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discounting the possibility out of hand. This is in contrast to the well-established links found by 
economists studying cigarette taxation and smuggling (see section 3.1.2.2). The already-present black 
market in tobacco, e-cigarettes, and e-liquids should not be viewed as a theoretical possibility of limited 
practical import. Instead, illicit trade in all these product markets—and the likelihood that stricter 
regulation and higher taxation will exacerbate them—must be part of the policy calculus from the 
beginning. This will involve planning for enforcement against illicit markets, which must include action 
stronger than the preferred tool of warning letters sent to noncompliant retailers and manufacturers 
currently used by the FDA.151 The policymaking must also recognize that harsher, more effective 
enforcement can create its own harms—a notion familiar to the harm reduction community regarding 
illicit drugs but curiously absent among anti-tobacco advocates.152  
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